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2011: High Profile Corruption Charges Have  
  Generated Public Concern 
STATE COURTS: 
Baltimore City Mayor Sheila Dixon (for her actions when she was 
President of the Baltimore City Council) 
Baltimore City Councilwoman Helen L. Holton 
Grand jury indictment of Del. Tiffany Alston 
 
FEDERAL COURTS: 
Prince George’s County Executive Jack Johnson and his wife (guilty 
pleas) 
State Senator Ulysses S. Currie (acquitted) 
Anne Arundel County Councilman Daryl Jones, convicted of failure to 
file federal personal income tax returns and business payroll tax 
returns, refused to resign while he served his prison term 
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S.B. 284 & 285 respond to the fact that the bribery 
indictments of Sheila Dixon and Helen Holton were 
dismissed on grounds of the “legislative privilege” 
in MD Const., art. III, § 18. 
 
“No Senator or Delegate shall be liable, in 
any civil action, or criminal prosecution, 
whatever, for words spoken in debate.” 
  
S.B. 284 amends the legislative privilege resulting 
from this provision so as to create an explicit 
exception for bribery, as defined in MD Const. art. 
III,§ 50, which was added in 1867. 
The 1776 Constitutional legislative privilege 
was derived from the English Parliament’s 
1689 similar provision, which Parliament had 
demanded of the newly crowned King William. 
 
Members of Parliament sought and obtained 
this protection to promote free and open 
debate, by precluding their prosecution by the 
Crown for seditious libel or criminal libel, as 
well as precluding their being sued civilly for 
defamation for words spoken in debate. 
Delegate Brown stated that:  
 
“[h]e could not prove before a jury that bribery and 
corruption had of late prevailed in our legislative bodies, but 
the charge had been made not only by the people, but by the 
press, and with such proofs that he believed it.” 
 
He argued that:  
 
“The question is simply shall the ancient honor of the State of 
Maryland be kept untarnished, or not?  Shall the integrity of 
our republican institutions be kept pure, or not?” 
It shall be the duty of the General Assembly, at its first session, held after the 
adoption of this Constitution to provide by Law for the punishment, by fine, or 
imprisonment in the Penitentiary, or both…, of  any person, who shall bribe, or attempt to 
bribe, any Executive, or Judicial officer of the State of Maryland, or any member, or officer 
of the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, or of any Municipal corporation in the 
State of Maryland, … in order to influence him in the performance of any of 
his official duties; and also, to provide by Law for the punishment, by 
fine, or imprisonment in the Penitentiary, or both,… of any of said 
[Executive or Judicial] officers, or members [or officers of the General 
Assembly, or of a municipal corporation ], who shall demand, or 
receive any bribe, fee, reward, or testimonial, for the performance of 
his official duties, or for neglecting, or failing to perform the same…. 
 
[The  next session the General Assembly passed the statute now  
codified as Crim. L. § 9-201 .] 
The intent behind Article III,§ 50 
seems to have been to create a 






This „legislative privilege‟ exists – for both State and City or County 
legislators – to provide “immunity when acting in the sphere of 
LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY.” 
 
“Illegal acts such as BRIBERY are obviously NOT in aid of legislative 
activity and legislators can claim no immunity for illegal acts.” 
 
       Montgomery County v. Schooley, 97 Md. App. 107 (1993) (quoting Bruce v. 
Ridley, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980) with approval ). Accord U.S. v. Brewster, 408 
U.S. 501 (1972). 
 
Reasons for Privilege and Immunity 
Are Not to Protect Bribery 
At its next session after the 1867 
Constitutional Convention, the General 
Assembly passed the statute now 
codified as § 9-201 of the Criminal Law 
article  (formerly Art. 27, §22), making 
legislators and other public officials 
criminally liable for bribery. 
 
§ 9-201(which is reproduced in full in SB 
285) tracks the language of Md. Const., 
art. III, §50.  
 
“A civil or criminal action may not be brought against a 
city or town councilman, county commissioner, county 
councilman, or similar official by whatever name known, 
for words spoken at a meeting of the council or board 




S.B. 285 amends this statute, so as to create an explicit 
exception for prosecutions under Crim. L. §9-201. 
1997: Md. Code Ann.,  Cts & Jud. Proc. § 5-526 was 
added, to further protect legitimate acts by 
legislators: 
 
“(a) A member of a state legislature, including a 
member of the General Assembly of Maryland, 
who makes a communication on behalf of a 
constituent is not civilly liable for defamation 
unless the communication is false and made with 
knowledge of or in reckless disregard of its 
falsity. 
 
 (b) This section does not supersede or constitute a 
waiver of a member’s constitutional, statutory, or 






Most of the reported cases under Crim. L. §9-201 
have involved bribes or kickbacks to executive 
agency officers for the awarding of contracts. 
Background: 
 
Baltimore City Councilwoman Helen B. Holton was 
Chair of the Economic Development and Public 
Financing Subcommittee until January 2007, and Chair 




She was indicted for allegedly having accepted a 
developer’s $12,500 payment for a political survey on 
her behalf, in exchange for her deciding vote in 
granting a tax break to Ron Lipscomb’s Inner Harbor 
East development project. 
The State Prosecutor argued that the legislative privilege did not 
apply to local legislators charged with state crimes. 
 
The court held that it did apply. 
 
The court construed the Maryland statutory legislative privilege 
for local legislators (Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-501) as having the 
same scope as the legislative privilege for General Assembly 
members, found in MD Const., art. III, § 18. 
 
The court construed the MD law the same way the US Supreme 
Court has construed the federal constitutional legislative 
privilege protecting members of Congress: the legislator may be 
prosecuted for bribery, but no evidence of her legislative acts 
may be admitted. 
 
 
Five members of the Court of Appeals held that the 
indictment must be dismissed due to legislative privilege, 
because the indictment relied upon evidence of Ms. 
Holton’s legislative acts.  
 
The bribery case never went to trial.  
 
Without the evidence of Councilwoman Holton’s legislative 
acts, all that could be proved was acceptance of a 
contribution in excess of the $4000 limit (to which she 
ultimately pled nolo contendere). 
 








The Holton decision to bar evidence of 
legislative acts in state prosecutions for 
bribery thwarts the intent underlying MD 
Const., art. III, § 50 and Crim. L. § 9-201. 
 
The federal constitution has no corollary to 
MD Const., art. III, sec. 50. 
 
The Court of Appeals neither cited nor 
discussed MD Const., art. III, sec. 50. 
Because it relied on evidence of Mayor Dixon’s legislative 
acts when she was on the City Council, Sheila Dixon’s  
bribery indictment was also dismissed. She went to trial 
on other charges and was convicted of misdemeanor 
embezzlement for her personal use of the Holly Trolley 
gift cards. 
 
She subsequently entered an Alford plea to perjury 
regarding her failure to disclose gifts from developer 
Ron Lipscomb and received a PBJ for her sentence as to 
both crimes.  
 
Under the terms of her plea bargain, she receives an 
$83,000 a year pension from Baltimore City taxpayers, 
and she will be able to run again for public office after 
her 4 years’ probation is over. 
 
SB 284 & 285 amend MD Const. art. III, § 18 and Cts. & 
Jud. Proc. § 5-501 to make the “bribery exception” to the 
legislative privilege explicit in STATE prosecutions of state 
or local legislators for bribery, just as such evidence is 
already admissible in trials of state or local legislators for 
similar federal crimes.*
 
These bills are intended to make it clear that evidence of 
legislative acts is admissible in bribery prosecutions in 
state courts, as well. 
* When state or local legislators are on trial for federal crimes, the 
federal criminal law supersedes state law, and no state privilege or 
immunity is recognized. 
Editorials urging the General Assembly to take 
decisive action against unethical practices seem 
to reflect widespread public sentiment. 
 
Passing SB 284 & 285 will show our citizens that 
the General Assembly does not tolerate bribery. 
 
SB 284 will put the explicit Constitutional 
“bribery exception” on the ballot in the next 
general election, so that the voters will see it. 
